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 S. SMITH
 TRYING TO BELIEVE AND THE
 ETHICS OF BELIEF*
 The problem I want to discuss has to do with believing as distinct from
 perceiving, imagining, positing, resolving, and hoping, as well as from know?
 ing. Since these distinctions are not always observed, we must remind our?
 selves what 'belief means when it is deliberately preferred to other inten?
 tional descriptions, and we ought to characterize it in such a way that we can
 see why it matters immediately, not just consequentially, whether one believes
 in something or not. I propose putting it this way : Believing in X (where X
 is what a belief-proposition is about) means taking X to be real, which in
 turn means accepting X as something to be dealt with. (A further impli?
 cation of'real', precluding private fantasy zones, is that any real X is dealt
 with not in isolation but in connection with everything else one has to deal
 with. ' Real ' implies ' the world '.) Unlike knowledge, which is originally con?
 ceived, so to speak, from the object to the subject - given that X is there, if
 I come along and see it there, then I am among those who know it is there -
 belief is conceived from the subject to the object: given that I am looking
 about me, if I see X there, then X is among the things I believe in, unless
 I mistrust it for some reason.
 There is a deep puzzle about belief. As a relationship with something taken
 to be real, one must (in believing) take it to depend fundamentally on the
 real thing rather than on oneself, on the existence and nature of the real
 thing, which means that a crucial condition of belief formation is involun?
 tary, outside of one's control. On the other hand, people can refuse to believe
 or, in interesting cases, try to believe - exerting themselves to believe in cases
 where they think they ought to. Some people can call on others to believe,
 e.g. to believe what certain religious propositions assert. All of which would
 imply that believing has a crucial voluntary condition. But how can believing
 be both voluntary and involuntary?1 The readiest answer would be that the
 voluntary and involuntary conditions of belief are alike necessary but not
 sufficient. In addition to the evidence there must be an affirming of the
 evidence ; in addition to the affirming, there must be the evidence. Very well ;
 * Ted Ammon, Jimmy Kimbrell and Louis Pojman gave me very helpful criticisms of an earlier version
 of this essay.
 1 For a comprehensive survey of the many variations of'volitionalist' and non-volitionalist accounts
 of belief, see Louis Pojman, Religious Belief and the Will (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986).
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 but there are curious situations wherein the involuntary condition is not met,
 or anyway isn't met yet - where people set themselves to believe in the
 absence of affirmation-compelling evidence.
 That there is such a thing as trying to believe does not mean that the
 involuntary condition of belief is not a necessary one. It only means that
 trying to believe is not the same as believing. But trying to believe is
 frequently associated with certain kinds of belief, kinds of belief which,
 perhaps, have to be tried for, and which are regulated by a distinct branch
 of the ethics of belief. Let us try to make out why this would be so by reflecting
 on how people come to be afflicted with difficulty in believing.
 Kantian moral theologians have a belief problem which is representative of
 much popular theism, although their case is especially difficult. They think
 that our rational moral sense tells us that people deserve to be happy in
 proportion to their moral virtue, and thus they say that our moral reason
 demands that virtue ultimately be rewarded with happiness - which could
 only be brought about by a God, and only in an unseen world.1 Their life
 as moral agents would become incomprehensible to them if they could not
 postulate this context for it - would make as little sense as, say, chasing and
 hitting tennis balls without being able to see court markings on the ground.
 Thus it is necessary for them to believe in this state of affairs, to treat it as real
 and not imaginary. Even though this belief is enjoined on them by reason,
 however, they still find it hard really to believe it, because the Kantian heaven
 is not, after all, evident in the way in which things-to-be-dealt-with normally
 assert themselves over against one; it is evident neither bodily (as a con?
 straint on perception) nor logico-mathematically (as a constraint on formal
 intuition). While Kant gives reasons to postulate that virtue will be
 rewarded, happiness does not stand before the mind's eye in connection
 with virtue in the way that '4' stands connected with '2 + 2'.'The virtue
 happiness union is the synthetic wish of subjects at once rational and
 natural, inconsistent with natural conditions but still conceivable as a
 possibility under other-than-natural conditions. It is 'known' as a necessary
 goal of striving, not as a real thing, event, or tendency.2 No wonder they have
 trouble believing in it.
 Think of these Kantians, disturbed by the invisibility of their providential
 heaven, as though they were tennis players demoralized by the invisibility of
 their tennis court (obscured, let us say, by a permanent knee-deep fog). They
 are beginning to feel like would-be players of tennis, rather than tennis players
 1 See Critique of Pure Reason B 856, and the second part of the Critique of Practical Reason. For a critique
 of Kant's reasoning see S. Smith, 'Worthiness to Be Happy and Kant's Concept of the Highest Good',
 Kant-Studien lxxv (1984), 168-90.
 2 See chapter 11 of the second part of the Critique of Practical Reason, Ak. 110-19, on tne 'antinomy of
 practical reason' and its 'critical resolution'.
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 in the full sense, and of course they are discouraged, since the actual playing
 of tennis is much more interesting and worthwhile than mere practice. Player
 1 offers an argument to boost their spirits :
 Listen, the regular pattern in our hitting implies that a court h functioning even
 though we can't see it. Our very acting as if a court were there guarantees its
 existence in the sense that matters. We are apprehending its reality through our
 actions.
 Player 2 replies:
 You're suggesting that there is no important difference between pretending to play
 tennis, or merely going through all the motions appropriate to tennis, and engaging
 in an actual tennis game. On your view it doesn't finally matter whether there is a
 court under this fog; but it does matter to me. To believe that I have served an ace
 on you I must believe that the ball bounced on the ground within a certain area
 before shooting by your racket. We will act as if that happened, but it is only because
 the 'as if links our actions to a presumed reality that we can count our actions as
 tennis. Whether this presumption has real grounds is precisely the problem; the 'as
 if cannot create the reality by itself.
 What matters to tennis players and Kantian moral subjects alike is being
 serious about their activities. And it is not just that they would like to feel
 serious; in all genuine action (as opposed to pretending) one addresses what
 one understands to be the real environment, acts in such a way as to deal
 with what is (relevantly) there to be dealt with. The need to believe is the
 need, attendant upon serious action, to apprehend and assent to a truth (like
 the existence and particular character of some thing or state of affairs) really
 and not merely notionally. Real apprehension and assent involve an experi?
 ence of subjection to the claim of a reality, whether or not by means of a
 direct impingement on the mind's faculty of representation like an 'impres?
 sion'; they are distinguished from mere readiness to cgo along' with a
 proposition or to act as if something were the case.1 Player i's argument tries
 to generate real assent to the existence of the tennis court from the reality of
 their play; Player 2 detects in this a distortion of the tennis reality principle.
 Tennis ought to be understood not only as persons pitted against each other
 under certain formal constraints but as an engagement of those persons with
 a particular material theatre of action, the tennis court. Player 2 needs to be
 given grounds for affirming the tennis court that derive from the court's own
 actuality. The fog puts this player in a bad position. For Kantians the
 position is actually hopeless, inasmuch as their epistemology rules out the
 very possibility of apprehending the Kantian heaven or anything other than
 natural phenomena.
 Kant himself, it is instructive to note, finessed this problem in the way he
 formulated the concept of belief. While he rightly distinguished between
 1 I follow Newman, Grammar of Assent, ch. 4.
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 the objectively sufficient grounding of 'knowledge' and the objectively
 insufficient-but-subjectively-sufficient grounding of'belief, he proceeded to
 disregard objective grounds for belief altogether, equating belief with sub?
 jective compulsion.1 Since the subject's own nature is a thought-compelling
 factor distinct from apprehension, apprehension is no longer essential to
 belief. The tennis players can play tennis out of their own necessary inten?
 tions and quit straining to see through the fog. Kant would side with Player
 i but correct him as follows: 'You are not exactly apprehending the reality
 of a tennis court in your actions ; you are merely postulating the court. But
 because the postulation is required by the very nature of your tennis-playing
 intention, which is a given in your case, you are not merely imagining or
 pretending'.
 In sympathy with Player 2, I would respond that while this sort of
 postulation may be a fine thing and wholly defensible, and may even
 correspond perfectly with one meaning commonly attributed to 'faith', it
 does not accord with the normal meaning of'belief. Collapsing belief into
 faith by not recognizing the element of apprehension in belief is simply a
 conceptual error. (Is there some epistemological bad humour here - that is,
 an indifference to anyone's having an apprehension if it can't be guaranteed
 for everyone?) At any rate, if the deal offered by Kant is the best available,
 then let it be acknowledged that the players are postulating rather than
 believing, and that they must accept the sense of unreality that goes with
 unbelieving postulation. They will continue to be bothered by the incon?
 gruity between their action and the apparent theater in which it is per?
 formed, for their need to believe will not go away.
 Because of what is at stake for people who need to believe, they will not
 neutrally watch for the sorts of experiences that form the right basis for belief;
 rather they will actively cultivate such experiences. This trying to believe is
 a strange project, since it involves the would-be believer shaping up an
 experience which should be determined by the object if it is to support real
 apprehension and assent. How can the subject and the object take charge at
 the same time?
 The obvious course open to a subject who needs to believe something is to
 search for telling evidence : to be in place when the fog lifts so as to glimpse
 the normally hidden tennis court, to have a detective keep tabs on a beloved
 whose fidelity is in doubt, to read an allegedly holy book waiting for a holy
 spirit's endorsement of it, etc. But although evidence collection is a way of
 pursuing belief, and is most likely a sign of desire to believe, it is not the same
 as trying to believe, which involves looking at whatever evidence is already
 1 Critique of Pure Reason, B 850.
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 on hand as a factor subjecting one to the reality of the object. Look at what
 might be an owl on a high tree branch ; try to believe it is one - not arbitrarily
 but because it must be an owl (nothing else would look just like that). Look
 at the evidence as evidence of an owl because, as you will realize, the owl's
 really being there must make the evidence take on that aspect...
 One way to satisfy this condition of non-arbitrariness in believing is to
 interpret the subject's very construing of evidence as part of his or her
 subjection to the real thing. If, for example, someone reads a book as the
 Word of God (that is, as the vehicle of a real apprehension of God), then that
 very reading, apparently an initiative of the subject, is assigned to God's
 more fundamental initiative. The Word of God speaks only to the hearer's
 belief, which in turn is understood as God's gift. (Not that every object acts
 in the way that this extraordinary 'object' is thought to; but every object has
 an effect in some fashion on the subject who apprehends it.) Thus the trying
 to believe that led toward belief may come to be interpreted retrospectively
 as having constituted in itself relevant evidence for the belief. In a hopeful
 mood, one can prospectively interpret it in this way (Why would I be trying
 to believe in X if X were not exerting some claim upon me?) ; but as long
 as one is still trying to believe rather than believing, the choice between the
 X and not-X aspects has not yet been done away with, the justifying
 constraint is not yet attained.
 There is another, rather different way in which looking at evidence as
 evidence of a certain reality is taken to be constrained by reality and thus
 authenticated. Consider this example. The belief that the sun is about
 93,000,000 miles away does not come easily, for nothing can look to us nearly
 so far away. Of course I did not have to put forth any great effort to believe
 this fact when I first learned it ; it must have seemed as reasonable to me as
 all the other astronomical figures I learned at the same time. But that was
 only notional assent. If at any moment I try to make real to myself the sun's
 remoteness - and if I disentangle the question of real distance from the
 difficulty I may have in appreciating huge magnitudes as such, in the
 weakness of my mathematical imagination - I find it hard to believe that an
 object so intensely present to me, in visual brilliance and heat, can be
 separated from me by so many miles. In order to believe this I have to
 apprehend the sun via scientific reports of it, which are trustworthy for
 complex reasons having no direct connection with the sun's presence to my
 senses. This apprehension involves placing the sun in a whole world-system
 that has been built up in my understanding by various reports and subject
 to manifold partial confirmations. Thanks to my understanding, I can see the
 sun as 93,000,000 miles distant, albeit with an effort of stretching my
 imagination. I have to believe in the sun's enormous size and temperature
 at the same time.
 The ordinary ethics of belief requires me to make the effort to believe in
This content downloaded from 141.117.125.173 on Wed, 28 Apr 2021 15:42:10 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 444 s- SMITH
 the sun's distance. The fundamental reason for this is that the available
 evidences of reality are interconnected in such a way that hosts of them would
 have to be disregarded if we failed to believe in one of them. The authority
 granted to 'science' in our ethics of belief rests precisely on its maintaining
 and expanding this system of apprehensions. It is the whole system weighing
 on me that furnishes the justifying constraint. In looking at the sun as
 immensely distant, I am being subjected to this system.
 When we compare the sort of case where the object of belief is unavailable
 for apprehension, like Kantian heaven, with the sort of case where the object
 is apprehension, like the sun, we encounter a typical difference between two
 classes of beliefs : religious, metaphysical, and moral, on the one hand, and
 scientific and everyday factual beliefs, on the other. Let us call these classes
 non-observational and observational. (I am not counting as 'moral'
 conduct-guiding views based solely on observation of what people do.) To be
 sure, science at least is also concerned with unobservable beings. Failure to
 observe X, when X is, say, a quark, does not seem to be crucial, when one
 can construe certain phenomena as traces of X. Nevertheless, in such cases
 the strictest scientific ethics of belief asks us to sit loose, to make believe rather
 than to believe in the proper sense, due precisely to the absence of a clinching
 apprehension. Availability for apprehension is a standard after all : we might
 have better reason some day to think that we are dealing with zarks instead
 of quarks.
 To each class of belief we can assign a maxim that is both descriptive and
 normative. Observational beliefs rest finally on the 'seeing is believing'
 principle (for all that perception is conditioned by conceptual and aesthetic
 predispositions). On the other hand, the testimony of non-observational
 believers suggests that the principle of religious, metaphysical, and moral
 beliefs is 'believing is seeing' (for all that believing is constrained by the
 form and actual contents of sense-perception). If this division is real, then
 'trying to believe' must have quite different meanings in the two belief
 worlds. In the former, one will reach for belief (acknowledgement of a reality,
 subjection of self to it) by accomplishing a perception, for instance, seeing the
 sun as very big, hot, and distant. In the latter, one will reach for a sense of
 something's reality by provisionally subjecting oneself to it, or find the reality
 in the self-subjection.
 The implication of this difference for the ethics of belief is important. For
 science as well as everyday factual awareness, the subject's capacity of
 acknowledgement is greater cause for concern than perception. Perception
 takes care of itself, relatively speaking, or can be gotten to taken care of itself
 with the right instruction, but what the subject is prepared to make of
 perception is variable and in need of discipline.1 (A disciplined attitude
 toward perception may require us to disallow certain 'credulous' percep?
 tions, e.g. seeing ghosts.) In religion and morality, however, the supreme
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 concern is with the subject's awareness, with the real vs. notional quality of
 apprehension and assent, while the chief issue in metaphysics is quality of
 understanding. Credulity may be a genuine problem in this frame of
 reference, too, but only a secondary one. In the realm of piety, for instance,
 maintaining all the right attitudes is relatively easy, and relatively dispen?
 sable, while experiencing as real the basis of pious attitudes, such as God's
 holiness or one's own sinfulness, is harder and more important.
 Under either aspect, the ethics of belief is concerned with what kind of
 people we are - credulous or tough-minded, proud or humble. Either way,
 the ethics of belief sinks a root into the ethics of personal virtue. The
 distinction we are entertaining reflects a division within moral sensitivity
 itself between the conditions of right dealing with the perceptible or intuit
 able and the conditions of right dealing with what is imperceptible in
 principle, the intentional reality of other persons and one's relationships with
 them. We have a faulty relationship to nature if we hold beliefs that are not
 warranted by available real apprehensions, but on the other hand it is
 disrespect toward other persons to fail to believe in the naturally imper?
 ceptible moral community of free and responsible subjects to which we all
 belong - something not unreal, but the reality of which is only accessible
 through subjection of oneself to it, and through undergoing the personal
 change that accompanies that subjection.
 Probably any belief that seems worth trying for beckons with the possibility
 of a personal transformation. Religious conversion is the most striking in?
 stance of this, but would one try to believe in so much as the sun's distance
 if not to attain an attractively higher consciousness? Thus a prime reason for
 trying to believe would be to become the sort of person that one necessarily
 is if one is engaged with the reality targeted by the belief. Tennis players
 want to be real tennis players - which requires belief in a real court. Kantians
 want really to be moral - which (they think) requires belief'that in the end
 it must make a difference whether a person has acted honestly or deceitfully,
 fairly or violently'.1 We treat it as significant information about people that
 they are moral agents or even tennis players, not just because this affects our
 predictions of what they will do, but as qualifications of what they immedi?
 ately are. One's own reality is not unaffected by the realities one apprehends.
 The point can be made the other way : the existence of the distinctive sort
 of people who are engaged with a certain reality constitutes in itself a basis
 for apprehending that reality, evidence for it that is apparent both to others
 and to themselves. There would not be real tennis players if tennis could not
 be apprehended, real moral agents if morality could not be apprehended,
 genuine devotees if the divine were unrealizable. (Tennis Player i's first
 argument can be developed along these lines, adjusting 'Our very acting as
 1 Critique of Judgment 458 (Akademie ed.); tr. W. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987), p. 349.
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 if the court were there guarantees its existence in the sense that matters ' to
 ' Our personal engagement in tennis is a notable sign of the reality-for-us of all
 of the necessary circumstances of tennis'. Player 2 is right that 'acting as if
 does not guarantee anything's reality, if the acting is supposed to produce the
 reality; but Player 1 means only to correlate the acting with the reality.) Now
 this sort of evidence is encouraging, not constraining - the existence of a
 worshipper hardly counts as a proof of the existence of God - and so can be
 rejected, although it will be welcomed by those who seek footholds for their
 believing or trying to believe. One can be sceptical of the personal qualities
 allegedly associated with believers' believing in X just as one can be sceptical
 ofX.
 How do we make up our minds whether another person is or is not a self
 deluder? It seems that we treat the amount and kind of trying involved in
 someone's believing as a criterion of its genuineness. In our dealings with
 matters that are essentially perceptible or intuitable, trying to believe is sus?
 pect, for it usually means that the phenomena are not supportive. But when
 it comes to things imperceptible, such as other intentional beings and rela?
 tionships as such, the most suspect beliefs are the ones that are held with no
 effort - for example, the sort of moral belief that is only subscription to pre?
 vailing social mores, or the ' Christendom ' sort of Christianity that Kierke?
 gaard attacked. Two things are chiefly wrong with these effortless beliefs:
 they confuse the visible with the invisible ('what people do' and 'what
 people say' with 'right' and 'true'), which is disrespect of the object, and
 they leave the subject in sloth, unroused and unattuned, less than fully actual
 qua subject. For both of these reasons, crucial beliefs ought to be tried for.
 Knowing that a moral agent has to try to believe in moral community is a
 sign that it is there, since if it were there that is what would be involved in
 apprehending it. Self-deluders are less likely to take the difficult way (unless,
 due to special psychological problems, they take the excessively difficult way).
 Trying in itself is reckoned a good thing and, up to a point, a good sign
 for whatever it aims at. We appreciate trying as a necessary condition for
 reaching many goals; more fundamentally still, we honour the revelation in
 trying, as it brings out both what the trier is capable of (adding to the trier's
 known being) and the capacity of the trier's goal to support exertion, that
 is, to seem worthwhile so durably that its seeming valuable looks more and
 more like really being valuable. Trying is a basic additive gesture in the
 drama of the waxing and waning of things that excites our hopes and fears.
 Most important is trying's responsiveness in cases like trying to believe - a
 goodwill gesture toward other beings, a dedication to the basic good of being
 aware of them and in partnership with them, which completes their presence.
 Trying has a life-cycle, though. It needs to succeed. Heroic up to a point, it
 is tragic or foolish after that point. The addition to the trier's being of sheer
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 trying without achievement is finally unfocused, ungrounded, misplaced : at
 best a potential greater being and never a real one.
 Accordingly, if one were aware only of a person's trying to believe in moral
 community, or in a specific moral good, one would judge the person a would
 be moral agent rather than a real one. People who have to try too hard to
 see the good of honesty make us feel a serious imperfection in our community
 with them. People who continually struggle with the feeling that adultery
 might be a good thing are not fully married. (In the analogous religious case,
 'believers' who try too hard are not properly believers at all; an absurdum
 proclaimed as the object of credo cannot simply be the maximally difficult
 object of belief.)
 It might be objected that the distinction between real and would-be moral
 agency is meaningless, since any affair of intention whatsoever is 'would-be'.
 But intentions are clearly affected by whether or not they engage something
 real. For example, there is a great difference between my intending to be a
 friend to a stranger, with whom I sympathize from a distance, and my
 friendly intention as it is maintained through the ups and downs of actual
 acquaintance. On the other hand, a real moral agent cannot be completely
 beyond trying for moral beliefs, or else these would lose their non-natural
 character. There must a certain balance between struggle and success, between postula?
 tion and confirmation, whereby the endeavour of the believer is qualified as a being
 drawn-by-the-object while at the same time the reality of the object is qualified as a
 to-be-realized-by-the subject.
 It is easiest to see this happening between persons intensely concerned with
 each other's unobservable intentional being, like lovers. Each lover loves
 because of the manifest lovableness of the other, yet that lovableness is
 conditioned, in a sense even created, by the loving that reaches toward it.
 One of them goes away on a trip ; the other is assailed by doubt, must try to
 believe in the beloved, marshalling his or her own power of trust and
 conferring out of it trustworthiness on the other; then the remembered
 gestures of the beloved and the letter that comes in the mail meet the trusting
 intention and confirm it, though not in such a way as to remove the need for
 it. The success requirement is satisfied, and yet trying continues. While it
 might be thought that perfect trust is quasi-instinctive and supersedes trying,
 a distinction surely ought to be preserved between trust and 'animal faith',
 and it seems that this distinction can only be founded on an irreducible trying
 in trust's element of belief.
 *
 Let us consider again the plight of the Kantians. They cannot get con?
 firmation of their belief in Kantian heaven because they understand their
 idea of it to be a production of their own reason, and they think it is
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 impossible to have a real apprehension of the object of the idea, which must
 lie beyond all sense-experience. They are doomed, therefore, to trying to
 believe without any success - which undermines their very trying. This is a
 pall that hands over the whole Kantian strategy of the postulates of practical
 reason'.
 There really are, on the other hand, believers in virtue's reward who are
 not exempt from the difficulties involved in the belief yet do not run into a
 total absence of confirmation. They do not merely postulate, they believe. By
 what amendment of Kantianism would this be possible? It could happen in
 one or both of two ways :
 (i) By encountering some confirmation in divine revelation of what
 human reason projects; for example, by hearing the words of a psalm on the
 expectations of the righteous as a divine speaking or as in some other way
 vouched for by God.
 (2) By apprehending certain phenomenal events as indicative of the
 postulated noumenal order; for example, by interpreting one's satisfied
 feeling upon freely turning in lost money as a confirmation of the belief.
 In both cases one would experience a kind of commandeering of the
 perceptible by the imperceptible, the imperceptible becoming by this means
 indirectly perceptible. The possibility that this event is caused by an
 imposition of the subject's expectations or wishes on the phenomena cannot
 be ruled out; but to the extent that worrying about this possibility impedes
 us in dealing fairly with all that we experience as real, we should put the
 worry itself in brackets (as Hume did with his sceptical doubts).
 Further, we ought to reflect that just this sort of event is requisite for our
 everyday relations with the intentions of other persons, which we are not free
 to disavow. I encounter the other person's intentional being through percept?
 ible events that are not identical with it. The other's intention is unquestion?
 ably there for me to deal with, is often very plainly shown in one sense,
 and yet it is fair to say that I never simply see it. If I saw it, I would not have
 epistemic space to entertain the Cartesian question whether the being I face
 is a robot or a person, and I do have that space ; yet I am not really at liberty
 not to credit a person with being a person, fcfr I am bound by a supra
 cognitive ' moral certainty '. I have to believe in the other's full personhood, or,
 more exactly, am called upon to do so. The belief may be built on a kind of
 involuntary basis, a ' possession ' of me by other persons prior to any choices
 I might make, but beyond this it always involves a certain variable exertion,
 usually invisible, like the exertion of moving the pedals by which one stays
 up on a bicycle.
 Suppose I want to put myself in someone else's place, as an exercise in
 moral imagination. I have to make real to myself what it is to be that other
 person. (The bicycle speeds up, makes a tighter turn... ) If I try to apprehend
 this other as real by means of the concept of an alien subjectivity, generically
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 like yet specifically unlike my own, 'over there', I have to exert myself
 considerably to succeed ; somehow I have to invest the alter ego concept with
 my ' moral certainty ' of the reality of others which I have in dealing with
 them. (These dealings are originally with You's, not with Other-I's.) It takes
 subjective effort to bring these factors together. It is a trying to believe, but
 not simply of the doomed sort, since - as we see in reviewing the ways in
 which we can become aware of other persons - we find plenty of confir?
 mation, and more of it the better we are ourselves.
 We have investigated the partnership between subject and object in the
 realm of 'belief, which is relative to the individual subject, rather than
 in the any-and-all-subjects realm of 'knowledge'. We have explored an
 unstable and ambiguous aspect that at least sometimes appears in this part?
 nership, the trying by which a subject takes proportionally more responsi?
 bility than the object for the realizing of the object's existence and nature.
 We have found that trying to believe belongs unavoidably to the formation
 of some beliefs, even though belief proper is not voluntary, and that trying
 is especially called for in the realm of nonobservational beliefs, serving (up
 to a point) as a sign of the genuineness of such belief or (past that point) as
 a sign of its futility.
 A background assumption that has undergirded the inquiry, without
 receiving much elucidation, is this : the quality of a conscious being's life is
 enriched or impoverished according to whether other beings are accepted as
 real. In other words, belief matters, for the closely allied reasons that (i) the
 identity and richness of the world, as the subject experiences it, depends on
 whether A or B or C is taken to be in it, and (2) the identity and richness
 of the subject's being depends at least partly on what the subject has to
 respond to. It goes beyond the scope of this essay to offer a complete
 argument for such points, and indeed they may be more like axioms than
 arguable points, but they should always be held in view; many discussions
 of belief ignore them.
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